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DESIGNATION OF HEIRS:
A MODEST PROPOSAL TO
DIMINISH WILL CONTESTS
Calvin Massey*
Editors' Synopsis: This Article explores the topic of designation of heirs,
particularly focusing on will contests that arise because of an abnormal
distribution of a decedent's estate by means of a will that favors a
beneficiary who is not an heir of the decedent. The Article proposes
procedures that could be employed to implement designation of heirs and
analyzes the problems with and utility of each procedure.
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Will contests function ideally to expose testamentary incapacity or
distortions of testamentary intention produced by deceit or duress. Our
tradition has been to rely on the adversarial process to discover and prove
such instances, by permitting disinherited heirs and beneficiaries under a
prior will to contest the validity of a will offered for admission to probate.
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But the motives of such claimants are not always pure.
John Langbein observed nearly a quarter-century ago that "the odor of
the strike suit hangs heavily over this field."' And why not? Disinherited
heirs or expectant devisees thwarted by a will leaving the bulk of the
testator's estate to an unloved beneficiary-a charity, a second spouse, a
same-sex partner, a paramour-often hire an aggressive and skilled trial
lawyer who threatens to expose every unseemly or eccentric trait about the
testator and the loathsome beneficiary in an effort to persuade ajury that the
testator was incompetent or coerced, or both. To avoid the uncertain
prospect of losing all, and in any case to avoid the diminution of the estate
by legal fees, the beneficiary will settle the claim, thus "overriding the
disposition desired by the testator and rewarding the contestants for
threatening to besmirch his name."2
This is not to say that all will contests lack merit. We do not want
elderly Alzheimer's victims who cannot remember their names, let alone
their property or their loved ones, to make binding testamentary disposi-
tions. Nor do we want to permit anxious, dependent, elderly people facing
death in lonely, and often institutional, circumstances to be "guided" to
disavow their true intentions in favor of an unscrupulous adventurer on
whom they may be dependent. The problem, of course, is how to improve
the method by which we separate the meritorious claims from the bogus
ones.
Ante-mortem probate has been suggested as one method,3 but it has
I John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REv.
63, 66 (1978).21d.
3 Ante-mortem probate is claimed to be better suited to disposing of the issues
commonly raised in post-mortem will contests because testamentary capacity and, to a
lesser extent, undue influence, can be more accurately resolved with a living testator instead
of a dead one. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 67, 84. Michigan enacted an ante-mortem
probate law in 1883 that was poorly drafted and declared inoperative two years later by the
Michigan Supreme Court in Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 23 N.W. 28 (1885). The
Michigan statute is reproduced in Aloysius A. Leopold & Gerry W. Beyer, Ante-Mortem
Probate: A Viable Alternative, 43 ARK. L. REv. 131, 185-86 (1990). The idea remained
alive in academic circles, however. See David Cavers, Ante-Mortem Probate: An Essay in
Preventive Law, 1 U. CHI. L. REv. 440 (1934); Langbein, supra note 1, at 64 n.6. Three
forms of ante-mortem probate have been advanced by the commentators: (1) the contest
model, which envisions ante-mortem probate as akin to a post-mortem will contest (see
Howard Fink, Ante-Mortem Probate Revisited. Can An Idea Have a Life After Death?, 37
OHIO ST. L.J. 264 (1976)), (2) the conservatorship model, which envisions a court-
appointed guardian ad litem to protect the interests of disinherited heirs and displaced
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never caught on with either legislators or the bar. Perhaps this is because
the three states that have adopted ante-mortem probate4 follow the "contest"
model of ante-mortem probate. In this model, the testator initiates an
adversarial proceeding against excluded heirs and beneficiaries under a
prior will and eventually obtains a declaratory judgment that the testator,
while possessing testamentary capacity and not acting under undue influ-
ence, validly executed the will offered for ante-mortem probate. Moving
a will contest into the testator's life is an unattractive, expensive proposal
for the living testator and is no more attractive for excluded heirs, who must
incur the wrath of the testator by openly challenging the testator's capacity
or the nature of relationships between the testator and the beneficiaries
under the proffered will.
Perhaps ante-mortem probate also lacks appeal because it may not
provide the certainty that is desired. If a testator's will is declared to be
invalid, he may simply execute a new will, raising new and unadjudicated
issues of capacity or undue influence. Even if a testator obtains a declara-
tory judgment of validity, he may still lack certainty that post-mortem will
contests will be precluded if some of his property is sited in another
jurisdiction that may not be required to recognize the ante-mortem probate
decree. In any case, ante-mortem probate decrees remain open for post-
mortem attack alleging fraud in the ante-mortem proceeding.'
Nonprobate transfers, especially via the revocable inter vivos trust, may
offer an effective method of discouraging, although not eliminating, the
prospect of a contest to one's estate plan. As with a will, a revocable trust
can be contested on grounds that the settlor lacked capacity or was under
the undue influence of a beneficiary. However, a revocable trust fully
funded during life with all the settlor's assets is difficult to attack success-
fully. This is because of the administrative nightmare of unwinding
hundreds or thousands of transactions of the settlor-trustee, who is subse-
devisees (see Langbein, supra note 1), and (3) the administrative model, in which ante-
mortem probate would proceed exparte (see Gregory S. Alexander & Albert M. Pearson,
Alternative Models ofAnte-Mortem Probate and Procedural Due Process Limitations on
Succession, 78 MICH. L. REV. 89 (1979)). See also Gregory S. Alexander, The Conserva-
torship Model: A Modification, 77 MICH. L. REV. 86 (1978). For a critical view of ante-
mortem probate, see Mary Louise Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 1066 (1980).
4 In the late 1970s North Dakota, Ohio, and Arkansas enacted ante-mortem probate
statutes. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-01
(1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081 (2002).
5 All of these criticisms have been made in Fellows, supra note 3.
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quently adjudged to have lacked capacity or to have been in the thrall of
undue influence exerted by a contingent beneficiary of the trust.
Another impediment to contesting a fully funded revocable trust is that
the decedent's heirs, the likely contestants, are not entitled to see the trust
instrument because it is not a public document. Thus, the heirs must choose
to contest the trust without adequate information to appraise the merits of
the suit, a risky gamble at best. Finally, even if these practical obstacles
deter contests of fully funded revocable trusts, few people of modest means
or minimal sophistication are likely to employ the revocable trust as their
estate planning tool. Unfortunately, if they employ an attorney at all, many
of these people will select counsel of modest understanding and minimal
competence in estate planning.
Other forms of nonprobate transfer may be effective means of avoiding
will contests, but none is without problems. Insurance, for those who can
afford to make the investment, provides a mechanism for conferring death
benefits on a designated beneficiary, but is of no help in insulating a
specific asset, such as a home, from a contest. Joint accounts have other
benefits and risks. A truejoint tenancy account gives the beneficiary access
to the account during the donor's life, thus making the donor dependent on
the beneficiary's honor if the real intention is merely to confer a death
benefit. A payable-on-death account avoids that problem, but raises others.
A payable-on-death account may be voided in some jurisdictions as a
testamentary disposition that fails to meet the formal requirements of a valid
will. Even if the payable-on-death account is treated as nontestamentary,
and thus valid,6 other uncertainties persist. It is not always clear whether a
beneficiary under a payable-on-death account must survive the donor to
take,7 nor is it always clear whether the death beneficiary may be changed
by will.8
6 See, e.g.,UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-101 (amended 1993),8 U.L.A. 460 (Supp. 2002),
which explicitly validates as nontestamentary a broad range of payable-on-death provisions
in written agreements.
7 Section 6-101 of the Uniform Probate Code does not address the point. Other
portions of the Uniform Probate Code, however, presume that a death beneficiary must
survive the donor to take and speak with clarity to that eventuality. Section 1-201 defines
a "beneficiary designation" as including virtually all written nonprobate transfers at death,
and section 2-706 provides an anti-lapse rule for such "beneficiary designations," the
protections of which apply if the deceased beneficiary is a "grandparent, a descendant of a
grandparent, or a stepchild of the decedent" donor. Of course, the Uniform Probate Code
is not universally adopted.
8 But see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-213(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 461 (Supp.
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Even if these or other problems are inapplicable or overcome, most
such payable-on-death accounts are effective only to transfer money. To
transfer specific nonfinancial assets, such as real property or valuable
tangible personal property, via a payable-on-death provision that is
nontestamentary, one must rely, in a Uniform Probate Code jurisdiction, on
the enigmatic terms of the final clause of the first sentence of section 6-
101(a): "or other written instrument of similar nature." Even if counsel is
confident that a written agreement to transfer such property at death to a
beneficiary likely to be contested by the decedent's heirs is within section
6-101, it is unlikely that unsophisticated clients will locate and retain such
skilled and knowledgeable counsel.
I offer an alternative approach, one that is supplemental to existing law
and a partial solution at best, but which offers the prospect of real benefits
for people with modest estates. I propose that states amend their intestacy
laws to enable people to designate their heirs, to the partial or total exclu-
sion of those persons who would otherwise be the actor's heirs absent the
designation. This proposal is not new. The Romans recognized such a
right,9 and two American states-Arkansas and Ohio-permit designation
of heirs.'0
2002), which explicitly provides that a beneficiary of a payable-on-death bank account may
not be changed by will. Insurance contracts produce the same result.
9 The Roman version of this right differs from my proposal by being broader in some
respects and more constrained in others. Roman law of intestate succession evolved
through three distinct periods: thejus civile, the praetorian law of bonorum possessio, and
the imperial law of Justinian. Throughout these three periods, intestate succession generally
was governed by kinship and marriage, not by designation, except regarding the effect of
adoption. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR
RELATION TO MODERN LAW 546-76 (1938). Romans, however, permitted testamentary
succession, a late development in English law, and perceived "the fundamental purpose of
a will [to be] to appoint ... an heir." Id. at 581. According to Gaius "a will derives its
validity by the [appointment] of an heir." Id. (internal citation omitted). Professor Burdick
suggested that wills arose among the Romans to enable a person lacking an heir in intestacy
to appoint one. Id. Because the Roman law of succession was one of universal succession,
a Roman heir took "the place of the deceased, inheriting all the rights and all the liabilities
of the deceased, the assets and also the debts, even though the deceased left nothing but
debts .... The heir was not only the personal representative of the deceased, his
administrator or his executor, but he was also, in many respects, legally identical with the
deceased." Id. Thus, the Roman law of testamentary succession combined elements of our
notions of testamentary succession with the idea of designating an heir.10 See ARK. CODEANN. § 28-8-102 (1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15 (2001).
The Arkansas statute has unbroken antecedents to 1853; the Ohio law dates from 1854. The
Arkansas statute provides:
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However, designation of heirs has not been discussed seriously as a
partial solution to the post-mortem will contest produced by an "abnormal"
distribution of a decedent's estate by means of a will favoring a beneficiary
who is not an heir of the decedent. Part I of this Article frames the issue
and explains the benefits obtainable by designating heirs. Part II discusses
the alternative procedures that could be employed to implement designation
of heirs, examines some problems with each procedure, and explains why
none of those problems is an insuperable barrier to widespread adoption of
designation of heirs. Part III is a brief examination of some of the problems
presented by the proposal. The Conclusion is a reflection upon its utility.
I. THE PROPOSAL AND ITS BENEFITS
Designation of one's heirs is a simple idea. Rather than rely exclu-
(a) In all cases, when any person desires to make a person an heir at law, it shall
be lawful to do so by a declaration in writing in favor of the person, to be
acknowledged before any judge, justice of the peace, clerk of any court, or before
any court of record in this state.
(b) Before the declaration shall be of any force or effect, it shall be recorded in
the county where the declarant may reside, or in the county where the person in
whose favor such declaration is made may reside.
The Ohio statute provides:
A person of sound mind and memory may appear before the probate judge of his
county and in the presence of such judge and two disinterested persons of such
person's acquaintance, file a written declaration declaring that, as his free and
voluntary act, he did designate and appoint another, stating the name and place of
residence of such person specifically, to stand toward him in the relation of an
heir at law in the event of his death. Such declaration must be attested by the two
disinterested persons and subscribed by the declarant. If satisfied that such
declarant is of sound mind and memory and free from restraint, the judge
thereupon shall enter that fact upon his journal and make a complete record of
such proceedings. Thenceforward the person designated will stand in the same
relation, for all purposes, to such declarant as he could if a child born in lawful
wedlock. The rules of inheritance will be the same between him and the relations
by blood of the declarant, as if so born. A certified copy of such record will be
prima-facie evidence of the fact stated therein, and conclusive evidence, unless
impeached for actual fraud or undue influence. After a lapse of one year from the
date of such designation, such declarant may have such designation vacated or
changed by filing in said probate court an application to vacate or change such
designation of heir; provided, that there is compliance with the procedure,
conditions, and prerequisites required in the making of the original declaration.
The best commentary on the operation of the Ohio statute is Albert H. Leyerle, The Ohio
Designated Heir Statute, 21 AKRON L. REv. 391 (1988). See also Ellis V. Rippner, Wills
Can Be Made "Unbreakable, "6 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REv. 336, 337-42 (1957).
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sively upon the state's designation of an intestate decedent's heirs (a
scheme that attempts to mimic prevailing cultural expectations concerning
distribution of a decedent's estate),1" any person with testamentary capacity
would be permitted to name an exclusive heir or heirs or to name one or
more persons who will share pro rata with heirs designated by the state. The
only limitation upon this principle would be that designation of an heir
could not operate to reduce or eliminate spousal inheritance rights or the
spousal elective share. 2
But why would anyone wish to designate heirs? Why not simply make
a will that produces the distributional scheme one desires and disinherits
one's heirs in the process, if that is the testator's intent? The short answer
is that disinherited heirs-whether they are children who feel wrongly
deprived of an expected inheritance or remote collaterals who hanker for a
windfall-have standing (and often motivation) to contest the will that
deprives them of what they wish to be theirs. Those contests may prove to
be successful. Professor Melanie Leslie, in an examination of will contests
based on undue influence and claimed defective execution, concluded that:
courts impose upon testators a duty to provide for those to whom
the court views as having a superior moral claim to the testator's
assets, usually a financially dependent spouse or persons related by
blood to the testator. Wills that fail to provide for those individuals
typically are upheld only if the will's proponents can convince the
fact-finder that the testator's deviation from normative values is
morally justifiable. This unspoken rule, seeping quietly but
fervently from the case law, directly conflicts with the oft-repeated
I Intestate succession statutes vary from state to state, but the general theme is to
distribute the intestate decedent's assets first to his children and surviving spouse
(sometimes to the spouse to the exclusion of the children); in the absence of such takers, to
the parents; lacking parents, to the decedent's siblings; and failing siblings, to more remote
collateral kindred.
12 Were Louisiana to adopt the proposal, an additional limit would be that no
designation of heirs could reduce or eliminate the legitime, a Louisiana civil law institution
that bars disinheritance of disabled or mentally infirm children and all children under the
age of 23. See LA. CIv. CODEANN. art. 1493(A) (West 2002); see also art. 1494 (providing
that a forced heir cannot be deprived of the legitime, the forced heir's portion of the
decedent's estate, without cause); art. 1495 (establishing the amount of the legitime, either
one-fourth or one-half, depending on the number of forced heirs). See also Ralph C.
Brashier, Protecting the Child From Disinheritance: Must Louisiana StandAlone?, 57 LA.
L. REv. 1 (1996); Katherine S. Spaht, Forced Heirship Changes: The Regrettable
Revolution Completed, 57 LA. L. REv. 55 (1996).
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axiom that testamentary freedom is the polestar of wills law.' 3
While a fully funded revocable inter vivos trust may be a reasonably
effective remedy to the problem, 4 this and other standard remedies are
likely to remain the province of the sophisticated and affluent who employ
equally sophisticated and affluent estate planners. The purpose of this
article is to explore whether designation of heirs can be an effective way of
increasing estate planning options for the vast majority of people with
modest assets and who lack effective access to sophisticated estate plan-
ning.
To illustrate the benefits of the designated heir proposal, imagine a
same-sex couple living in a state that denies the status of marriage to such
couples. Each member of the couple wishes to devise his entire estate to his
partner, and has executed a valid will to do so. But the couple is aware that
each has relatives who disapprove of the relationship or who refuse to
acknowledge its existence. They anticipate a will contest based on undue
influence, and the homosexual nature of the relationship may be used in part
to establish the existence of undue influence. 5 Fearful of the expense and
13 Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 235, 236
(1996).
14 But see supra text following note 5.
15 Cultural attitudes toward same-sex relationships have changed greatly in recent
years, but one cannot wholly discount the possibility of egregious cases such as In re
Kaufmann's Will, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), aff'd, 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y.
1965). In that case, Robert Kaufmann, a young man made wealthy through inheritance,
lived together in a stable relationship with Walter Weiss, a slightly older man of no
significant wealth, for eleven years until his untimely death at age forty-five. Robert
devised the bulk of his substantial estate to Walter. By a letter attached to his will, Robert
described his enduring love and admiration for Walter and credited Walter for helping
Robert to accept his homosexuality. During life, Robert painted and exhibited his work;
Walter managed the couple's financial and domestic affairs. They maintained an extensive
social life as a couple and, although in the course of the ensuing will contest brought by
Robert's brother Walter denied a sexual relationship with Robert, it is apparent that they
were a committed and loving gay couple. Nevertheless, two juries in separate trials found
undue influence and those verdicts were affirmed on appeal. Robert's letter expressing his
love and gratitude toward Walter was regarded by one appellate court as "cogent evidence"
of Walter's domination of Robert. Id., 247 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
For commentary on In re Kaufmann's Will, see THOMAS L. SHAFFER, DEATH,
PROPERTY, AND LAWYERS 243-57 (1970); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81
MINN. L. REv. 571, 592-600 (1997); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the
Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 225, 239-48 (1981).
For cases presenting similar facts but finding no undue influence, see Estate of Sarabia,
270 Cal. Rptr. 2d 560 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (codified and supplemented by statute); Evans
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uncertainty of a will contest, they may well seek to employ some device to
foreclose a will contest. Consider the standard approaches to this problem
and compare them to the designated heir proposal.
The couple could add a no-contest clause to their wills. While such
clauses generally are enforceable, most jurisdictions permit will contests
despite such clauses, so long as probable cause exists for the contest. 6
Probable cause may not be difficult to establish. The burden of proving the
absence of undue influence shifts to the proponent of the will once the
contestant has established both a confidential relationship between the
testator and the beneficiary and suspicious circumstances surrounding the
execution of the will. A contestant should easily be able to prove the
confidential relationship, and cultural prejudice (as in Kaufinann's Will 7 )
may well skew the fact-finder's view of suspicious circumstances. Accord-
ingly, many jurisdictions permit and, indeed, encourage a will contest under
these circumstances.
Further, regardless of the applicable law, for a no-contest clause to be
effective, the anticipated contestants must be devised a sum sufficient to
tempt them to forego the will contest. This is an unpalatable choice for
many testators who regard such devises as, at best, expensive and uncertain
v. Ma, 923 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App. 1996).
1 See South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 101 A. 961, 963 (Conn. 1917); In re
Cocklin's Estate, 17 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Iowa 1945); In re Foster's Estate, 376 P.2d 784, 786
(Kan. 1963); In re Hartz's Estate, 77 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Minn. 1956); Haynes v. First Nat'l
State Bank ofN.J., 432 A.2d 890,903-04 (N.J. 1981); Ryan v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,
70 S.E.2d 853, 855 (N.C. 1952); Wadsworth v. Brigham, 259 P. 299, 304 (Or. 1927); In re
Friend's Estate, 58 A. 853, 865 (Pa. 1904); Rouse v. Branch, 74 S.E. 133, 135 (S.C. 1912);
Winningham v. Winningham, 966 S.W.2d 48, 50-54 (Tenn. 1998); In re Chappell's Estate,
221 P. 336, 337 (Wash. 1923); Dutterer v. Logan, 137 S.E. 1, 2 (W. Va. 1927); In re
Keenan's Will, 205 N.W. 1001, 1003 (Wis. 1925); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.,
Donative Transfers § 9.1 (1983); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-517 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A.
161 (Supp. 2002) (replicated in UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-905, 8 U.L.A. 272 (Supp. 2002);
Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, What Constitutes Contest or Attempt to Defeat Will
Within Provision Thereof Forfeiting Share of Contesting Beneficiary, 3 A.L.R. 5th 590,
624-27 (1992); Annotation, Validity and Enforceability of Provision of Will or Trust
Instrument for Forfeiture or Reduction of Share of Contesting Beneficiary, 23 A.L.R.4th
369, 376-81 (1983).
A minority of jurisdictions enforce no-contest clauses unless the clause is claimed to
be a forgery or the contestant attacks a devise that benefits the will drafter or any witness.
See, e.g., Burch v. George, 866 P.2d 92 (Cal. 1994); Rudd v. Searles, 160 N.E. 882 (Mass.
1928); Commerce Trust Co. v. Weed, 318 S.W.2d 289, 301-02 (Mo. 1958); Elder v. Elder,
120 A.2d 815 (R.I. 1956).
17 See supra note 15.
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insurance premiums, and, at worst, a form of extortion. Nor can it be
assumed that contestants motivated by a desire to punish the beneficiary as
wicked and undeserving will be deterred from a contest by a generous
bequest conditioned upon foregoing a will contest.
A more drastic approach is adult adoption. Many American states
permit adult adoptions, even when the purpose of the adoption is simply to
frustrate a will contest, 8 but adoption is hardly a perfect solution to the
concerns of the same-sex couple. First, some jurisdictions may object to
adoption of an adult by his or her homosexual partner. Emblematic of this
approach is In re Adoption of Robert Paul P.,"9 in which the New York
courts denied adoption by a fifty-seven year old man of his fifty year old
male lover on the ground that their sexual relationship was not compatible
with the proposed parent-child relationship. Such concerns have not,
however, deterred courts from approving adult adoptions involving
heterosexual lovers.2" Second, and even more problematic, is the fact that
while one partner might be able to adopt the other, courts are not likely to
permit mutual adoption. It is one thing to become the legal parent of one's
life partner; it is another, and a quite unlikely, thing to become both the
parent and the child of one's life partner. Finally, adoption is irrevocable.
In the event that the couple should terminate their partnership, they are
saddled for life with the consequences of adoption.2' Of course, after
separation the adoptive parent could disinherit his former partner and
18 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1993) (upholding
adoption of a fifty-one year old man by his sixty-six year old male companion of seventeen
years); Greene v. *Fitzpatrick, 295 S.W. 896 (Ky. 1927) (upholding a male bachelor's
adoption of his female secretary, a married woman, amid allegations of a sexual relationship
between them); Collamore v. Learned, 50 N.E. 518 (Mass. 1898) (upholding adoption of
three adults by their seventy year old uncle).
19 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984).
20 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 18.
21 Under some circumstances, the inheritance consequences of adult adoption may
extend no further than the property of the adoptive parent. Compare Harper v. Martin, 552
S.W.2d 690 (Ky. App. 1977) (holding that an adult adoptee could inherit from the adoptive
parent's sibling by right of representation), with In re Trust of Duke, 702 A.2d 1008 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995) (holding that Chandi Heffner, the adult adopted child of
billionaire Doris Duke, was not the child of Duke for purposes of a trust created by James
Duke, Doris Duke's father, for the benefit of Doris Duke and her children) and Minary v.
Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 419 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Ky. 1967) (holding that an adult
adoptee may not be considered a child of the adoptive parent when the purpose of the
adoption is to bring the adoptive child within the class of takers under "a preexisting
testamentary instrument when he clearly was not intended to be so covered").
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adoptive child, but such disinheritance invites yet another will contest,
albeit one that is likely to have little merit absent unusual particularized
circumstances.
Nonprobate transfers offer another possible strategy, but most of the
available options have significant limitations. Inter vivos gifts accomplish
little unless one partner is markedly wealthier than the other. Additionally,
the irrevocable nature of gifts, and the limitations of the federal gift tax,
operate as powerful disincentives to employing this strategy. Insurance
requires the ability to afford the premium investment and is effective only
to transfer money, not specific and unique assets such as real property.
Similar problems attend the use ofjoint accounts to accomplish nonprobate
transfers.22 Perhaps the best alternative, and surely the one most attractive
in the absence of a designated heir option, is the use of a revocable inter
vivos trust or trusts. If the couple is willing to pool their assets, they may
establish and fund a revocable trust with themselves as trustees and life
beneficiaries, with a remainder in the survivor. If they are unwilling to pool
their assets, they may establish separate revocable trusts, each naming
himself as the trustee and life beneficiary, with the remainder in his partner.
Although the establishment of these trusts is susceptible to attack on
grounds of testamentary capacity or undue influence, the practical ability
to challenge these trusts is limited. First, their establishment is unlikely to
be known to potential challengers. Second as transactions occur over time
under these trusts, declaring them invalid and unwinding those past
transactions becomes ever more difficult.
While the revocable trust may be an adequate solution to the problem
of the same-sex couple, many such couples will be disinclined to use this
option. There is a common misconception that trusts are complex. Even if
that canard is dismissed, the fact remains that the trust instrument (or a
certified summary sufficient to prove its existence and the identity and
powers of the trustees) must be furnished to various entities with which the
trustees transact business. While this is not especially onerous, many
people are frightened away from the revocable trust by ignorance of the
nature of the administrative burden it represents. A great many people,
especially those with poor or no legal advice, will dismiss this option
without serious consideration.
By contrast, if the partners are able to designate each other as their sole
heir, it will become considerably more difficult for disappointed displaced
22 See supra text accompanying notes 6 and 7.
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heirs to contest the estate plan. Unless the contestants can set aside the
designation, they will lack standing to mount a will contest. Assuming the
designation procedure2 3 provides a strong, perhaps conclusive, presumption
of testamentary capacity and lack of undue influence, the only grounds for
contesting the designation would be fraud, which is difficult to prove.
Should the partners separate, their estate plans may be altered with relative
ease. The designation of one's partner as heir may be revoked by the same
procedure necessary for designation, and even if that prudent step were not
undertaken, each member of the sundered pair could simply execute a new
will.24
Designation of an heir is not a complete cure for the estate planning
problems of the same-sex couple. Were the couple married, they would be
entitled to a host of status benefits germane to estate planning. The most
obvious benefits are community property (where applicable), the spousal
elective share, and the unlimited marital deduction for federal estate tax
purposes. However beneficial or important reform of the legal methodol-
ogy of conferring such status benefits may be, my focus is on the narrow
topic of enhancing freedom of testation by designation of heirs."
A partner in a same-sex relationship is not the only testator likely to
benefit from designation of heirs. Many of the same observations apply to
the testator, married or not, who wishes to include a step-child, an illegiti-
mate child, a remote relative, a friend, or even a charity, as either his sole
heir or on a par with his children. The following is a consideration of these
scenarios.
23 See discussion infra Part II.
24 Of course, a new will made without alteration of the designated heir would leave the
new will open to contest by the former partner and still designated heir.
25 The appropriate scope of freedom of testation is an important and large normative
question that is outside the limited focus of this paper. Plainly, we circumscribe freedom
of testation by such devices as estate and inheritance taxes (including the generation
skipping transfer tax), the spousal elective share, Louisiana's forced share that extends to
certain children, and the rule against perpetuities. A diverse set of policies motivates those
limitations. Inasmuch as a fertile source of will contests is the disinherited child, one way
to diminish will contests is to limit testamentary freedom further by establishing forced
shares for children, whether minors or adults. But this, of course, raises normative issues
about the state's role with respect to family dynamics, issues that if discussed here
thoroughly would swallow this paper as completely as the whale that engulfed Jonah. Alas,
if that is the paper you would prefer to read, you must turn elsewhere. For extended
discussion of the Louisiana forced share approach, the scope of which has been curtailed in
recent years, see Symposium, 57 LA. L. REv. 1 (1996); Symposium, 43 Loy. L. REv. 1
(1997).
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Unless adopted by their step-parents, step-children are not intestate
heirs of the step-parent, 26 yet, many parents may wish to treat their step-
children the same as their natural children. Short of a will, adoption is the
obvious solution, but sometimes adoption is not an option because the
natural parent refuses to consent to the adoption. Absent a specific statute
permitting such a step-child to be treated as an intestate heir of the step-
parent, 27 the step-parent must make a will to pass property at death to the
step-child. This may prove problematic as will contests are often triggered
by sibling jealousies. Therefore, a will that treats the step-children of the
testator on a par with his natural children is a will contest waiting to happen.
However, if the testator could designate his step-children as heirs on a par
with his natural children, the incentive to contest the will is removed, for the
natural children can derive no benefit by forcing an intestate distribution.
Imagine the testator with an illegitimate child whose parentage he does
not wish to acknowledge during his life, but who wishes to treat the child
equally with the children of his marriage. Assuming (perhaps quite
unrealistically) that such a person both wishes to leave a bequest to his
illegitimate child and is willing to reveal the existence of some relationship
after death, the testator has two options. He might simply include the
illegitimate child in his will, although such inclusion might trigger a will
contest by jealous and surprised children of the marriage. Alternatively, he
might designate the illegitimate child as an heir on a par with his adult
children. This approach would not diminish thejealousy and surprise of his
marital children but might preclude a contest to his will.
These principles discussed above are readily adaptable to a variety of
circumstances. A testator who wishes to disinherit one or more of his
children in favor of the remainder need only designate the favored child, or
children, as his sole heir(s), thus cutting off the possibility of a contest by
the disinherited child or children. The same principle enables a testator to
designate a friend or remote relative as his heir, thereby supplanting his
children entirely or replacing a disfavored child with the remote relative.
There is no reason to limit the designation to natural persons. Should a
testator desire to bequeath a disproportionate amount of his estate to a
charity, there is no obvious reason why he should not be able to designate
26 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATECODE §§ 2-106 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 85 (Supp. 2002)
2-114 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 91-92 (Supp. 2002). But cf CAL. PROBATE CODE § 6454
(enabling step-children whose natural parent refuses to consent to adoption by a step-parent
to be treated as an heir under some circumstances).27 See, e.g., CAL. PROBATE CODE § 6454.
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a charity as his designated heir.28
In any case, the success of any such designation to stifle an incipient
will contest depends on the legal effect of the designation. If a designation
of heirs is subject to contest on the same grounds as a will, the contest
simply shifts to focus upon a different moment at which the testator has
made a testamentary decision. Any diminution in contests that occurs from
such a shift is entirely the result of such a shift in focus. For example, if
contests over designation are required to occur during the life of the
designator, many of the factors associated with contest of ante-mortem
probate will also apply.29 On the other hand, if designation of an heir
produces a presumption of capacity and against undue influence, and that
presumption is difficult to overcome, the designator will have achieved
significant added security that his testamentary plan will withstand chal-
lenge. The possible procedures and circumstances that might trigger
presumptions favoring designation of heirs is the theme of Part II.
II. ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES FOR DESIGNATION OF HEIRS
The devil lurks in the details of implementing designation of heirs,
partly because there is a cornucopia of possible designs. A thorough
taxonomy of possible procedural models mimics the procedural proposals
for ante-mortem probate, providing for designation of heirs by a wholly
nonadversarial process, a fully adversarial one, or a procedure somewhere
in between. The nonadversarial processes may be further divided into a
ministerial and an administrative process. The adversarial processes may
be divided into a quasi-adversarial,"conservatorial" process and a fully
adversarial procedure. Each of these four possibilities will be discussed but,
before doing so, a few preliminary observations are in order.
As noted earlier, the revocable living trust may be as effective as
designation of heirs to discourage contests, but only the relatively affluent
and sophisticated are likely to employ a revocable inter vivos trust. For less
sophisticated people to designate heirs, the procedure must be cheap,
simple, and conducive to accurate results with respect to testamentary
capacity, undue influence, and fraud. It must be cheap, simple, and easy to
understand, or it will not be used by people of modest means with a
rudimentary grasp of the law surrounding testamentary dispositions.
Inasmuch as the concept of designation is foreign to lay understanding, it
28 It would be necessary to apply the cy-pres doctrine to designations of charities as
heirs.
29 See supra text accompanying notes 3-5.
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must be simple and easy or it will be unable to take root in the popular
culture. The designation procedure must produce reasonably accurate
results-neither false positives nor false negatives for undue influence,
fraud, or lack of testamentary capacity- without compromising simplicity
and economy. If some form of adversarial or quasi-adversarial procedure
is necessary to produce an acceptable level of accuracy, the idea of designa-
tion will remain entirely theoretical.
Nevertheless, I discuss the full range of options to provide a decent
assessment of the incremental benefits of accuracy that might intuitively be
thought to correspond with increasing levels of complexity and adversarial
conflict. I think it is impossible to know the accuracy of the current highly
adversarial will contest system regarding these issues. The system is not
perfect, and indeed, if the sentiments of the commentators is any gauge of
the matter, the level of error may be uncomfortably high. Thus, the
appropriate evaluation of any hypothetical designation procedure is not
whether the error rate is likely to be "high" or "low" in absolute terms, but
whether it is likely to produce significantly more or fewer errors than the
present adversarial will contest system.
A. Ministerial Procedure
A ministerial procedure would be accomplished simply by filing in a
central registry in the state of the declarant's domicile a signed declaration
designating the person or persons as heirs, either exclusively or in addition
to existing heirs.3" No notice to any party would be required. The registry
would be open to public access unless the declarant indicated he desired
confidentiality, in which case the fact and substance of the declaration
would be kept confidential until the declarant's death.31
This procedure would be easy, cheap, and provide reliable evidence of
30 A notarial acknowledgment might be a prudent additional requirement, simply to
ensure that the declarant's designation is not forged by an unscrupulous imposter. To make
the process especially simple, a form could easily be prescribed for the purpose, enabling
a declarant to make the necessary choices by means of checking the appropriate boxes.
Something similar to this occurs with statutory forms for durable powers of attorney
relating to medical care after incapacity.
31 Confidentiality, if afforded, would cease at the moment a declarant chooses to notify
displaced heirs of the designation. See infra text following note 34. To administer such a
scheme of confidentiality, it would be necessary to require the declarant to notify the central
registry of his waiver of confidentiality at the same time he notifies displaced heirs of the
designation. Failure to notify the central registry would toll the limitations statute otherwise
triggered by notice to displaced heirs. See text and notes following note 35.
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heir designation, but it does have disadvantages. Because a declarant need
do nothing more than file the designation, there would be no impartial
check on undue influence or testamentary capacity. An attestation require-
ment similar to that required for execution of a will might provide some
evidence of testamentary capacity, but the regular occurrence of will
contests challenging the capacity of a testator to execute a duly attested will
suggests that this approach to proof of capacity is not promising. Because
attestation is of almost no relevance to claims of undue influence, an
attestation requirement for designation of heirs seems almost pointless for
this purpose.
Attestation of wills serves a ritual or cautionary function, impressing
upon the testator the finality and importance of his testamentary disposi-
tions; an evidentiary function, supplying excellent proof of the testator's
intentions; a protective function, safeguarding the testator from undue
influence; and a channeling function, providing a presumptive safe harbor
that the testator's wishes will be executed.32 In the context of designation
of heirs, however, attestation would serve only the ritual function. The
evidentiary and channeling functions of attestation are fully advanced by an
heir designation that is notarized but unattested, and the protective function,
which is poorly served by attestation even with respect to wills,33 is neither
advanced nor retarded by a ministerial system of designating heirs.
The ministerial system would not afford notice to statutory heirs
displaced by the designated heir. Lack of such notice poses no constitu-
tional problem. Heirs apparent have no legally cognizable interest in the
assets of the prospective decedent; accordingly, a secret designation of heirs
does not infringe upon any interest to which the guarantee of due process
attaches. The lack of such notice would, however, pose a practical problem
to a person who wishes to employ designation of heirs as a device to
foreclose his next of kin from contesting his will. Because the heir designa-
tion could be procured by fraud or undue influence, or occur at a moment
when the declarant lacked testamentary capacity, ordinary principles of the
32 See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous
Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 3-6 (1941) (identifying the ritual, evidentiary, and protective
functions of attestation); John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 489, 494 (1975) (identifying the channeling function).
33 See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 32, at 9-10 (speculating that attestation served a
protective function when wills were primarily deathbed instruments, a moment when a
testator might be peculiarly susceptible to undue influence, but contending that attestation
is irrelevant to the protective function when most wills are executed "in the prime of life
and in the presence of attorneys").
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law of wills should dictate an opportunity for displaced heirs to contest the
designation on those grounds which, of course, is precisely what the
declarant seeks to avoid.
The effect of the ministerial filing with respect to possible contests of
the designation should depend on two variables: whether the declarant has
notified displaced heirs34 and whether the designation is confidential or a
public record. If a declarant chooses to notify displaced heirs, this notice
should trigger a limitations statute of the same length within which a will
contest could be brought on grounds of fraud, undue influence, or lack of
testamentary capacity.35 If the declarant chooses not to notify displaced
heirs, a limitations statute should begin to run only if the designation is a
matter of public record. Ordinarily, constructive notice from the public
record in real estate transactions is premised upon the responsibility of a
purchaser to examine the record to be certain that his vendor actually has
and can deliver marketable title. The public record of real estate title
transactions is maintained for the benefit of purchasers, and it is equitable
to insist that a purchaser take with constructive notice of its contents, but
that principle is not transportable to designation of heirs. There is no
purchaser for whose benefit the public record is maintained and there is no
logical moment when one might expect the record to be examined, as is the
case with real estate transfers. However, the moment that such a record
begins to be compiled, it is inevitable that profit-seeking data base operators
will quickly make those records readily available at the click of a computer
mouse. Even so, why should one examine the record to see if one's parent
or grandparent has designated heirs that exclude you? The short answer is
that those who are likely to mount a contest are the most anxious to monitor
any indication of the soon-to-be-decedent's testamentary dispositions, and
those who are disinterested in the matter will not make such an examina-
tion. After a long enough period of time, perhaps the people who lack
interest in the testator-declarant's estate plan should be precluded from
challenging the designation. If the declarant is willing to place his designa-
34 The declarant could give notice by personal service, or perhaps by certified mail, to
an address the declarant affirms to be the last known address of the displaced heir or heirs.
If the location of a displaced heir is unknown, perhaps notice by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in the community in which the missing heir was last known to reside
would be sufficient.
35 Perhaps because the legal consequences of heir designation are not as culturally
recognized as the legal consequences of probate, it might be advisable to require that notice
to displaced heirs include a statement that the opportunity to contest the designation
judicially will expire within the specified period after notice is provided.
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tion in the public record, but just does not want to rub the disinheritance in
the faces of his former heirs by giving them notice, at some point the
sleeping heir ought to lose the ability to challenge a designation.
The harder problem is deciding the length of such a limitations period.
As a rough cut at the problem, I propose a limitations period two or three
times the length of the applicable period if notice had been given. If
designation were to become a familiar option and the existence of such
public records widespread, it would be no hardship for an heir apparent who
suspects his ancestor might have a testamentary plan that excludes him to
check the record. Few will contests are the product of utter surprise, and
those who bring contest litigation are surely among the most likely to
inspect public records of designated heirs.
Finally, if no notice is given and the declarant has requested that the
designation be kept confidential, any limitations statute relevant to contests
of the designation should not begin to run until the declarant's death.
However, execution and filing of the designation should produce a pre-
sumption of capacity and lack of undue influence or fraud. This presump-
tion could be overcome, as in most civil trials, by a preponderance of the
evidence. On the other hand, designating certain persons as heirs (such as
the declarant's attorney, unrelated to the declarant by blood or marriage)
should produce a presumption of undue influence.36
The ministerial procedure, augmented by an optional notice procedure,
would be cheap, simple, relatively easy to administer, and afford significant
additional protection to the person choosing to designate his heirs. Almost
all contests of an heir designation would occur while the declarant is alive,37
thus improving the accuracy of resolution of issues such as undue influence
and testamentary capacity. Of course, as is true of ante-mortem probate,
displaced heirs may be loath to challenge a living declarant's designation
of heirs. The testator whose will is successfully challenged in ante-mortem
probate on any ground other than testamentary capacity is likely to draft a
new will that specifically disinherits the contestants, and that testament will
be carefully framed to avoid the defects of the challenged will. That fact is
a significant disincentive to will contests in ante-mortem probate. Simi-
36 This disfavored category of designated heirs should also be denied the benefits of
the limitations period otherwise applicable to the designation.
37 Some declarants will die before the limitations period for contesting the designation
has expired and, of course, with respect to designations in which confidentiality is obtained,
the limitations period would not begin to run until the declarant's death. Thus, at least some
contests of designation would occur after the declarant's death.
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larly, a displaced heir who successfully challenges an heir designation on
any grounds other than testamentary capacity is likely to be rewarded by a
new designation of heirs that carefully avoids the tainted grounds of the
prior designation, but firmly excises the contestant from the class of the
declarant's heirs.
While it cannot be known with any certainty, some indicators suggest
that a ministerial procedure will produce marginally greater accuracy with
respect to capacity, undue influence, and fraud. Declarants who seek
confidentiality may be more likely to be victims of undue influence, and
such designations, like wills, would be open to challenge after the declar-
ant's death. Conversely, if the declarant's acts are truly those of a superbly
cunning testamentary ventriloquist, the designation might be placed in the
public record on the theory that the limitations statute will cut off the
possibility of challenges before the displaced heirs are aware of the undue
influence. However, heirs apparent are usually aware of the existence of
testamentary predators and, in a system in which heir designation is known
to exist and a public record available, reasonable expectations dictate that
the prudent and concerned heir apparent might check the public record to
determine if the suspicious "friend" of one's ancestor has managed to
secure designation as the heir. If the limitations statute is long enough (say,
four to six years), there is ample opportunity for concerned relatives to
make periodic inquiry of the record to determine whether a challenge to an
heir designation might be merited. Finally, the declarant who truly wishes
to achieve certainty, whether or not the victim of undue influence, will
notify displaced heirs and challenges. To the extent that the reluctance of
displaced heirs to challenge the designation made by a living declarant
increases the risk of error, the risk may well be offset by the increased
reliability of results that will occur with respect to those contests that do
occur.
Designation of heirs through a ministerial filing procedure thus seems
to afford some increase in certainty of testamentary disposition without any
material increase in the risk of erroneous dispositions. Recall that risk of
error means either (1) the failure to detect lack of capacity, undue influence,
or fraud, or (2) the false detection of lack of capacity, undue influence, or
fraud. Contest litigation can produce either error, but systemic disincen-
tives to institute contest litigation can produce only the former error.
Compared to conventional will contests, heir designation by the ministerial
system outlined here would produce a slight increase in the first type of
risk, attributable to deterrence of some meritorious contests, but it would
also probably produce modest decreases in both types of risk, attributable
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to more reliable outcomes of contests that do occur with respect to living
declarants. Any net change in risk of error is not likely to be large, and
would thus seem to be inconsequential, while ministerial heir designation
would augment testamentary freedom for people who by economics or
imperfect understanding are not users of revocable inter vivos trusts as an
estate planning tool.
Though I think the ministerial procedure is preferable to the alternatives
and doubt that the alternative procedures, if adopted, would be much used,
it is useful to explore the details of alternative procedures, if only to make
a fair comparison of the various options.
B. Administrative Procedure
A close cousin to the ministerial process would be the administrative
procedure, a procedure by which a person seeking to designate his heirs
makes application in the probate court of the jurisdiction of his domicile.
The application is referred to a magistrate or other administrative hearing
officer who undertakes an examination of the applicant and, if necessary,
the designated heir or heirs to determine that the applicant possesses
testamentary capacity and that the proposed designation does not appear to
be tainted by fraud or undue influence. This administrative finding would
be incorporated in an approval of the application to designate heirs, and an
administrative order to that effect would be filed in a central registry in the
jurisdiction. As with the ministerial procedure, this central registry could
be maintained as a public or confidential record, subject to the same
provisos. No notice to displaced heirs would be provided, unless the
applicant desires to trigger a limitations period applicable to contests of the
designation.
What, then, would the administrative procedure add to the ministerial
procedure? First, it would provide a presumption, perhaps conclusive, of
testamentary capacity and a rebuttable presumption that the designation of
heirs was unaffected by fraud or undue influence. The burden of proving
undue influence or fraud would fall squarely upon the contestant,38 and the
38 The burden of proof of undue influence is not uniformly upon the contestant in will
contests. Some states shift the burden of proof to the proponent of the will when the
proponent was in a confidential relationship with the testator, received most of the estate,
and the testator's mental state was diminished. Some states also require proof that the
proponent actively facilitated the making of the will in order to shift the burden of proof
concerning undue influence. See WILLIAM M. McGovERN, JR., SHELDON F. KURTZ & JAN
ELLEN REIN, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 279-82 (1988). A presumption of undue
influence arises in many states if a lawyer not related to the testator drafts a will in which
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evidentiary burden might be increased to a clear and convincing standard
from the ordinary preponderance of the evidence standard.39 Second, an
applicant could be afforded the following three options that bear upon
elimination of contests to the designation of heirs: (1) no notice to displaced
heirs, producing only the benefits of the presumptions in contests that might
later emerge, (2) notice to displaced heirs of the completed and approved
designation, triggering a limitations period equal in length to the period for
initiating will contests, or (3) notice to displaced heirs of the pendency of
the administrative proceeding, triggering a shorter period within which a
displaced heir could either (a) intervene, and thus transform the administra-
tive proceeding into an adversarial one, or (b) accept the appointment by the
probate court or administrative hearing officer of a guardian ad litem to
represent the interests of the notified displaced heir, and thus transform the
administrative proceeding into a "conservatorial" process.4 °
The administrative approach would provide some additional protection
to the person seeking to designate heirs, in the form of the presumptions
discussed above, at a relatively modest additional cost. Moreover, by
providing an option for converting the administrative procedure into a
conservatorial one, applicants would be better able to select the degree of
insulation they desire from later challenges to their designation of heirs.
C. Conservatorial Procedure
In the conservatorial model, the person desiring to designate heirs
would apply to the probate court of the applicant's domicile for an order
designating heirs. The order would be issued only after the court had
determined that the applicant possessed testamentary capacity and that the
proposed designation was free from undue influence or fraud. Unlike the
administrative approach, however, the burden of investigation would not be
lodged with the hearing officer, but would be shifted onto lawyers. The
court would be required to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the
the lawyer is a beneficiary. See, e.g., Krischbaum v. Dillon, 567 N.E.2d 1291 (Ohio 1991).
The wisdom of doing so might be related directly to the degree to which the
magistrate is charged with a civil law-style duty of independent investigation and
empowered to discharge that duty effectively. It is not likely that many American states
would import the civil law magistrate model, even in this administrative setting.
40 Should such notice include a statement of the approximate value of the estate, on the
theory that displaced heirs might not contest the designation out of ignorance of the size of
the estate? Notice of value makes the decision of whether to contest the designation more
informed, but such notice is not usually required for other proceedings pertaining to
testamentary dispositions.
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interests of the displaced heirs, presumably at the expense of the applicant,
but without the consent or knowledge of the displaced heirs. Only after a
hearing following investigation by the guardian ad litem, and determina-
tions by the court that the applicant possesses testamentary capacity and that
the application is not procured by fraud or undue influence would an order
designating heirs be issued.
The point of this more cumbersome, expensive, and time-consuming
feature would be to ensure a more accurate determination of the issues4
while still shielding the applicant from a direct confrontation with, and
likely wrath of, displaced heirs. The effect of the order would, at least, be
to provide a conclusive presumption of testamentary capacity and a
rebuttable presumption of absence of fraud or undue influence. The
reliability of these presumptions would be greater than their invocation
following the administrative procedure previously described, and thus more
justifiable. Moreover, to the extent that the conservatorial model is thought
to produce particularly reliable results (at least by comparison to the
administrative model), it might be acceptable to provide that the rebuttable
presumption of no fraud or undue influence may only be overcome by clear
and convincing evidence. It would be inappropriate to cut off any opportu-
nity for the displaced heirs to litigate these issues, however, because they
would not have received either notice or opportunity to contest the matters.
Thus, the applicant seeking to designate heirs might be given the option to
notify displaced heirs of the conservatorial procedure, informing them that
if within a specified period they fail to object to their representation by the
guardian ad litem they would be bound by the outcome.42
The conservatorial model increases the accuracy of determination of the
issues presented by a designation of heirs. When coupled with either
presumptions that may not be overcome save by clear and convincing
evidence or with an "opt-out" notice mechanism that would bind displaced
heirs that fail to opt out of the conservatorial process, the increased certainty
of the conservatorial system might justify its expense. On the other hand,
if a jurisdiction is committed to the creation of a civil-law-style magistrate
41 The conservatorial method represents a middle ground between the model of the
investigating magistrate and the adversarial process as the best mechanisms for determining
truth. The burden of investigation is shifted onto the guardian ad litem, whose interests are
adverse to the applicant, though perhaps the zealousness of the representation might not be
as sharply adversarial as would the work of an attorney retained directly by displaced heirs.
42 This procedure is materially similar to that afforded members of a class in class
action litigation under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23.
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endowed with broad investigative powers, and such a magistrate takes
seriously the responsibility entrusted to him, the administrative model might
perform as well as the conservatorial model at less cost.
D. Adversarial Procedure
The adversarial procedure is at once familiar, very costly in terms of
time, money, and emotional resources, and calculated to produce a final,
reasonably accurate determination of the underlying issues. The applicant
desiring to designate heirs would file suit in the probate court of the
jurisdiction of his domicile, requesting a declaratory judgment designating
his heirs, and naming as parties his heirs to be displaced. Personal service
of summons and complaint upon the displaced heirs would be required and
adjudication of the matter would proceed as in ordinary civil actions. The
principal benefits of this approach are finality and the enhanced accuracy
of fact-finding that is presumed to result from the zealous advocacy of sharp
adversaries. These benefits are very costly, however, and it is difficult to
justify a system in which a person seeking to designate heirs is confined to
the adversarial model.
On the other hand, the adversarial model can be incorporated readily
into the other procedures as an available option. A sensible combination,
though perhaps overly complex, would be a ministerial procedure coupled
with an administrative option that could be converted by the applicant's
election into a conservatorial procedure offering the notice options de-
scribed earlier. The adversarial procedure would always remain an option.
Thus, persons seeking to designate heirs could have a wide range of
options, producing a spectrum of increasing certainty of binding effect as
the cost, complexity, and adversarial nature of the chosen procedure
increases. However, as indicated earlier, because the benefits of heir
designation are most likely to be reaped by people who wish to use heir
designation as a simple will substitute, the only procedure that is apt to be
used much is the ministerial system.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSAL
A variety of problems might be anticipated were designation of heirs to
become widely available and frequently used. I make no claim of having
anticipated all such problems; rather, I attempt in this Part III to discuss the
issues that seem most obvious and likely to occur. If the proposal meets a
human need and finds a friendly reception in popular demand, no doubt the
fecund legal imagination will amply expose and discuss whatever deficien-
cies of foresight I may exhibit.
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A. Revocation
Unlike adoption, designation of an heir would not be irrevocable.43
Circumstances germane to inheritance change, a fact recognized by the law
of wills. Because designation of heirs would primarily be a device to
prevent will contests, and because it represents introduction into intestate
succession of the well-established principle of testamentary freedom, there
is no conceptual reason to deny a person the power to revoke the completed
designation of heirs.
Of course, revocation raises some of the same issues previously
discussed regarding the procedure of designating one's heirs. The desig-
nated heir whose status as such is about to be revoked is as much a dis-
placed heir as any other. Accordingly, the same procedural mechanisms
that would be available for designation of an heir should be available to
revoke such a designation. Similarly, a later designation of heirs that is
manifestly inconsistent with a prior designation should be treated as a
revocation of the former to the extent of the inconsistency. For example,
if the first designation stated that "my exclusive heirs shall be John Adams
and the National Trust for Historic Preservation," and a second designation
proclaimed that "my exclusive heirs shall be Abigail Adams and the
National Trust for Historic Preservation," the second designation clearly
43 Consider the celebrated 1988 adoption by seventy-five year old heiress Doris Duke
of a thirty-five year old Hare Krishna, Chandi Heffner. The relationship promptly soured.
When Doris Duke died in 1993 she left her billion dollar estate to charity. Duke was the
life beneficiary of two trusts created by her father, James Duke, which created a remainder
in favor of Doris Duke's issue, and in default of such issue, to charity. Because Doris Duke
had no natural children and she deeply regretted her adoption of Heffner, she stated that
regret in strong terms in her will: "I am convinced that I should not have adopted Chandi
Heffner. I have come to the realization that her primary motive was financial gain." She
also recited her belief that her father would never have considered Heffner her child and
would not want her to benefit from the trusts. For the litigation that ensued between
Heffner, the trusts, and Duke's estate, see In re Trust of Duke, 702 A.2d 1008 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1995); In re Duke, 663 N.E.2d 602 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996). After losses in the trial
courts, Heffner settled with the trusts for sixty million dollars and with Duke's estate for
five million dollars. For news accounts of the affair, see Don Van Natta, Jr., Accord Clears
the Last Will of Doris Duke for Probate, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1996, at B8; David Stout,
Bernard Lafferty, the Butler for Doris Duke, Dies at 51, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1996, at B8;
Matthew Purdy, Lawyers are Feeding on an Heiress's Vision, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1997,
at B 1. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text. Had a designated heir procedure
been available to Doris Duke and that procedure been used in lieu of adoption, Duke could
have revoked the designation and preserved for the charitable beneficiaries an additional
sixty-five million dollars plus attorneys' fees.
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revokes the earlier designation of John Adams as an heir. But if the second
designation stated that "my heirs shall include Abigail Adams," no revoca-
tion would occur because it is consistent with the prior designation to add
Abigail Adams as an heir. Problems emerge when the second designation
is more ambiguous, as when it states that "Abigail Adams is my heir." The
statement's literal meaning is that she is the declarant's sole heir, but in the
context of a prior designation, it may be that the declarant intended merely
to add Abigail as an additional heir. This problem is familiar; the law of
wills holds that a later will revokes an earlier will to the extent of the
inconsistency between the two,44 and a later will that does not expressly
revoke an earlier will but that makes a complete disposition of the testator's
property is presumed to revoke the earlier will entirely because of the
inconsistency.45
Unlike wills, however, these issues are more easily avoided in the
context of designation ofheirs. In any of the administrative, conservatorial,
or adversarial procedures, the opportunity exists for counsel or a court to
insist that the designation be entirely free of ambiguity. While the ministe-
rial model would seem to be wholly within the control of the declarant, the
unfortunate effects of ambiguity could be minimized by providing a
standard form that must be used for the purpose of designation of heirs, and
incorporating specific questions within that form that must be answered by
the declarant for the designation to be accepted for filing.46
B. Pretermitted Heirs
All states provide some form of protection for the child born to a
testator after the execution of his will, 47 usually in the form of an intestate
44See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507(a) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 151 (Supp.
2002): "A will or any part thereof is revoked (1) by a subsequent will which revokes the
prior will or part expressly or by inconsistency .... "
45 See § 2-507(c) (stating a "testator is presumed to have intended a subsequent will to
replace rather than supplement a previous will if the subsequent will makes a complete
disposition of the testator's estate"). See also Blake's Estate v. Benza, 587 P.2d 271 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) PROP., Donative Transfers § 33.2, cmt. b (1990).
Cf Lamb v. Lamb, 28 Mass. 371 (1831) (involving wills and inconsistent codicils); In re
Peck's Estate, 144 A. 686 (Vt. 1929).
46 For example, the form might specifically require the declarant to check and initial
a yes or no box in response to the question, "Do you want the person or persons designated
here as your heir or heirs to be your exclusive heirs, thus replacing all other people as your
heirs?" Additional such questions could be devised to ensure maximum clarity of the
declarant's intentions.
47 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 322 (Supp.
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share. The premise of these statutes is that the testator's omission is likely
to have been inadvertent. The same premise suggests that if a person should
designate heirs such that his children are partially or entirely displaced as
heirs, a later-born child of the designator ought to be treated as an heir,
despite the designation, unless the designator has explicitly stated in his
designation that he intends to displace later-born children as heirs. If the
designator fails to make this explicit statement, he could always make a new
designation after the birth of any later-born child.
C. Collateral Effects on Intestate Succession
Should a designated heir be permitted to inherit through the person
designating him as an heir? Should the heirs of a designated heir who
predeceases the designator be permitted to inherit from the designator by
representation? The Ohio Supreme Court, the only court to have occasion
to answer these questions, concluded that the answer to both questions is
no, but those conclusions are interpretations of the Ohio designated heir
statute, which deems the designated heir to be a child of the designator for
inheritance purposes. A better answer is that a designated heir generally
should not be permitted to inherit through the designator, but the heirs of a
designated heir who predeceases the designator generally should be able to
inherit from the designator through the predeceased designated heir.
In Blackwell v. Bowman4" a designated heir was denied standing to
contest the will of the deceased designator's brother. The Ohio court ruled
that the designated heir's legal status as the child of the designator for
inheritance purposes was a legal status that applied only to the designator
and the designated heir, having no effect on strangers to the designation.49
The court's rationale was that a child is adopted to establish a genuine
parent-child relationship,5" but that designation of an heir is an instrumental
maneuver designed to produce succession benefits only between the two
parties to the designation. In Kirsheman v. Paulin,5 the children of a
designated heir who had predeceased the designator were denied standing
to contest the designator's will. The Ohio court reasoned that the desig-
2002)j
4 80 N.E.2d 493 (Ohio 1948).
49 See id at 498.
50 Under Ohio law at the time Blackwell was decided, adopting an adult was
impossible. Ohio now permits limited adult adoption. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.02
(2000).
51 98 N.E.2d 26 (Ohio 195 1).
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nated heir's legal status as a child of the designator for inheritance purposes
was not fixed for all time by designation, 52 but was determined at the death
of the designator. Thus, a designated heir who predeceases the designator
is no heir at all, and his own heirs may not inherit from the designator
through him.
The real issue in both cases is whether a "stranger-to-the-designation"
rule should be created and applied. With the advent of adoption laws in the
latter part of the nineteenth century,53 courts initially developed the
"stranger-to-the-adoption" rule. This rule presumptively barred an adoptive
child (whether or not adopted as an adult and regardless of whether the
adoption was an instrumental succession device) from taking under a will
or trust made by anyone other than the adoptive parent.5 4 Exceptions
designed to account for the probable intentions of the testator soon devel-
oped, particularly with respect to wills." However, the inequity of the rule,
despite the exceptions that were grafted onto it, became apparent as
adoption became more widespread and socially accepted. In most jurisdic-
tions today, the stranger-to-the-adoption rule has been abandoned,56 but
because abandonment of this rule occurred haphazardly, through judicial
decisions and legislation that often did not make the elimination of the rule
retroactive, inclusion or exclusion of an adoptive child may turn today on
the state of law at the time of the testator's death. 7
52 See id. at 32. The Ohio Supreme Court contrasted this with adoption, when the
adoptive child's status as a child is irrevocably fixed at the moment of adoption.
53 Adoption was not possible under the common law. See Leo Albert Huard, The Law
of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743 (1956); Stephen B. Presser, The
Historical Background of the American Law ofAdoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971).54 See, e.g., Copeland v. State Bank and Trust Co., 188 S.W.2d 1017 (Ky. 1945). See
also JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 759 (6th
ed. 2000).
55 One exception permitted the adoptive child to take under the will of a testator who
was a stranger to the adoption so long as the adoption occurred prior to the testator's death.
This exception was based on the theory that the testator had an opportunity to excise the
adoptive child from the class of takers and the testator's failure to do so was an indication
of his intent that the adoptive child should share in the bequest. Another exception was to
interpret bequests to "A's children" as including A's adoptive children, whether or not
adopted prior to the testator's death, but to read a bequest to "A's issue," "A's descendants,"
or "the heirs of A's body" as referring to natural lineal descendants. A bequest to "A's
heirs" is, of course, ambiguous under this doctrine.56 See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 54, at 759-60.
57 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. King, 651 N.E.2d 127 (Ill. 1995); In re
Estate of Nicolaus, 366 N.W.2d 562 (Iowa 1985); New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v.
Groswold, 444 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 1983). See also Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Issues About
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Given this history, one might think it surprising that Ohio has judicially
declared a stranger-to-the-designation rule as an analogue to the discarded
stranger-to-the-adoption rule, but there is a plausible rationale for applying
the stranger-to-the-designation rule to inheritance by a designated heir
through the designator. Intestate succession law flows from the premise
that the system of statutory heirs mimics, by and large, the testamentary
intentions of most people. The intestate system of per stirpes distribution
to heirs of a predeceased heir also is based on the presumption that most
people do not wish to exclude from inheritance the heirs of their own
predeceased heirs. This makes the most sense, of course, when a child of
the intestate decedent has predeceased the decedent, survived by grandchil-
dren of the decedent. This presumed intent becomes far less certain,
however, when a stranger is substituted for the lineal descendants of the
predeceased heir. When adoption was new, most people likely would have
regarded the adopted child of their kinfolk as a stranger to the family.
People might well have thought of an adopted nephew, niece, or even
grandchild as an outsider, artificially daubed with the colors of family.
Those feelings are neither common nor socially acceptable today, a fact
recognized by the nearly universal rejection of the stranger-to-the-adoption
rule. Even so, I suspect most people today would regard some versions of
adult adoption as nothing more than instrumental succession devices that
should have no legal significance outside the adoptive pair, a fact of some
import because the relevant analogue is between designation of heirs and
adult adoption.58
In brief, the argument for applying the stranger-to-the-designation rule
to the problem of a designated heir inheriting through the deceased designa-
tor is that this rule is more likely to comport with the presumed intention of
intestate decedents than is the converse rule. However dysfunctional
families may be, most people likely would prefer their kinfolk as heirs over
people designated by their kinfolk. As with adoption of children, attitudes
on this point may change, but in the absence of any evidence to support a
presumption that intestate decedents would wish to bequeath their property
Issue: Some Recurrent Class Gift Problems, 48 Mo. L. REV. 333, 336-40 (1983).
58 This view apparently undergirds section 2-705 of the Uniform Probate Code, which
includes adoptive children within class gifts to heirs, but also provides that
in construing a dispositive provision of a transferor who is not the adopting
parent, an adopted individual is not considered the child of the adopting parent
unless the adopted individual lived while a minor, either before or after the
adoption, as a regular member of the household of the adopting parent.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 187 (Supp. 2002).
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to strangers selected by their heirs, the stranger-to-the-designation rule
should apply.59 This would not interfere in any way with the primary
purpose of designation-ensuring a testamentary disposition from designa-
tor to designee without interference from the "natural" heirs of the designa-
tor.
On the other hand, the stranger-to-the-designation rule has much less
to commend it when applied to the problem of the heirs of the designated
heir inheriting the designator's estate through the designated heir. This case
will arise only when the designator has failed to make a complete testamen-
tary disposition. Once an heir is designated, the designator is presumed to
know that his property will pass to his designated heir, or through him if he
should predecease the designator. A designator who fails either to revoke
the designation or make a testamentary disposition after his designated heir
has predeceased him has manifested, albeit inferentially, his desire that his
property should pass to the heirs of his designated heir by right of represen-
tation. Moreover, if the heirs of the designated heir were not permitted to
inherit by right of representation, the possibility of escheat would rise
dramatically. Whenever a person designates another as his sole heir and
dies after the sole heir has died, the failure to permit inheritance by right of
representation will result in escheat.6° Abandonment of the stranger-to-the-
designation rule in this context would not impede the primary purpose of
designation and would comport more closely with the presumed intention
of the designator.
D. Collateral Effects on Wills and Trusts
What effect, if any, should a person's designation of an heir have on a
will or trust created by someone other than the declarant? An analogous
problem occurs when a person adopts an adult for the purpose of making
him an adoptive child and thus a beneficiary under another's will or trust.
Accordingly, states wishing to permit designation of heirs would be wise to
introduce designation through legislation that clearly addresses the follow-
ing issues: (1) whether, and under what conditions, a designated heir is
59 A caveat to this conclusion is in order. When the deceased kin of the designator
have had actual notice of the heir designation made by their relative, there is much less
reason to presume that inheritance of their property by the designated heir through the
designator is contrary to their intentions.
6 If the jurisdiction applied the principle that a designation of heirs is effective only
at the death of the designator, then upon death of the designator after the designated heir
ordinary principles of intestate succession would apply, which would rarely produce
escheat.
WINTER 2003
37 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST JOURNAL
included in a class gift by another to the designator's "heirs," and, if so, (2)
whether the inclusion operates retroactively with respect to wills that
became effective or trusts created prior to the legislation?
An analogous problem is presented by the phenomenon of adult
adoption, a practice engaged in almost exclusively for instrumental inheri-
tance purposes, such as including the adult adopted child within a class gift
to children of the adoptive parent. The Uniform Probate Code takes the
position that people adopted as adults without having been a part of the
adopting parent's household while a minor are to be excluded from such
class gifts when they are phrased to refer to "children," "issue," or "heirs."61
The judicial view of this matter is mixed.62 The use of adoption as the
device to enlarge a class of beneficiaries under another person's donative
instrument may be a source of the problem because it is sound public policy
to treat adopted children as undifferentiated children. When a designated
heir is substituted for an adult adopted child, the problem is easier to
resolve. First, there is no dispute that a class gift to the "children" or
"issue" of the designator does not, genetically speaking, include a desig-
nated heir.63 Second, when the class gift is to the "heirs" of the designator,
and the gift is made under an instrument that was known and in existence
at the time of the designation, it is a reasonable inference that the designa-
tion was motivated in part by the designator's desire to appoint someone as
61 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 (amended 1991), 8 U.L.A. 187 (1998). See
supra note 58.
62 For cases either excluding adult adoptive children from class gifts under instruments
made by someone other than the adopting parent, or applying the Uniform Probate Code
rationale to uphold such gifts, see Cox v. Whitten, 704 S.W.2d 628 (Ark. 1986); In re Estate
of Joslyn, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 616 (Cal. App. 1995); In re Trust Created by Belgard, 829 P. 2d
457 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Cross v. Cross, 532 N.E.2d 486 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Minary v.
Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 419 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); Davis v. Neilson,
871 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); In re Duke, 702 A.2d 1007 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997); Solomon v. Central Trust Co., 584 N.E.2d 1185 (Ohio 1992); Foster v. Foster, 641
S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App. 1982). But for cases finding adult adoptive children to be takers
under donative instruments made by someone other than the adoptive parent, see In re
Estate ofFortnoy, 611 P.2d 599 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980); Evans v. McCoy, 436 A.2d 436 (Md.
1981); Satterfield v. Bonyhardy, 446 N.W.2d 214 (Neb. 1989); Hagaman v. Morgan, 886
S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App. 1994).
63 This assumes that the jurisdiction, in enacting legislation to permit designation of
heirs, would not follow the Ohio model of making the designated heir a child of the
designator for purposes of inheritance. The Ohio courts have dealt with the issue by reading
the Ohio statute to mean that the designated heir is a child only for purposes of inheritance
directly from the designator and only if the designated heir survives the designator. See
supra notes 10, 48 and accompanying text.
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a taker under that instrument. Third, there are multiple reasons to think that
the creator of such an instrument would not likely have intended to confer
a benefit on someone appointed by the designator. The donor could have
created a power of appointment in the designator but did not. Designation
of an heir in this context is tantamount to the exercise of a special power of
appointment. It would be a subversion of the donor's intent to allow
another person effectively to exercise a power of appointment that never
was created by the donor.
Moreover, it is not altogether fanciful to think that the power to
designate an heir, if construed to confer the power to bring the designated
heir into a class gift to "heirs," might cause the corpus of that gift to be
included in the taxable estate of the designator. If any person or entity
could be designated an heir, the designator presumably would be able to
designate his estate, his creditors or the creditors of his estate as his heir.
This possibility might be enough to cause the power to designate an heir to
be treated as a general power of appointment.64 It would be poor public
policy indeed to saddle unknowing donors and beneficiaries of trusts with
tax consequences that are created inadvertently by operation of law,
especially when that law is produced by a jurisdiction not levying the tax.
Thus, it would a better choice to declare that the designation of an heir
has no effect on any other donative instrument created by a person other
than the designator. Third-party donors wishing to benefit the designated
heir remain free to do so either explicitly or by necessary implication from
the terms of a donative instrument created after the designation has occurred
and is known to the donor.
E. Disclaimer
As with other property interests transmissible at death, a designated heir
should be free to disclaim his interest. The usual effect of disclaimer, under
the disclaimer laws of most states, is to treat the disclaimant as having
predeceased the decedent. 65 This situation highlights the importance of
dealing correctly with the problem of whether the heirs of the designated
64 Federal tax law includes within the taxable estate the value of property over which
the decedent at the time of his death held a general power of appointment. See I.R.C.
§ 2041 (1988). Internal Revenue Code ("Code") section 2041(b) defines a general power
of appointment to be "a power which is exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, his
creditors, or the creditors of his estate." Code section 2514(c) uses the same definition for
purposes of the gift tax.
65 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-801(d) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 207 (Supp.
2002).
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heir may inherit from the designator by representation. The ability to
disclaim bequests and inheritances is an important, albeit relatively minor,
part of post-mortem estate planning and is of great importance to an
insolvent heir.66 There is no sound reason why these benefits should be
denied to designated heirs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Academic scholarship may be divided into works of theory and works
of application. Of course, some people think scholarship equals theory, and
others think theory equals scholarship. Neither equation is universally true.
This is a work of application, not a work of over-arching theory, concerning
accommodation within our system of inter-generational wealth transmission
of the multiplicity of ways in which we choose to live our lives entwined
with others. Theory, at its best, can be ground-breaking, even, in the trite
phrase, paradigm shifting, but many theories plow well-traveled furrows
without turning up anything new. In any case, it often takes awhile for even
the most brilliant of legal theories to work substantial change in the daily
lives of people. None of this is to deride the manufacture of theories, a
practice in which I have participated as much as any active scholar, but
rather to suggest that sometimes a modest change in the application of
existing structures might have significant and immediate benefits. That, I
believe, is the case with designation of heirs.
Consider the application of this concept to the facts of In re Will of
Moses.67 Fannie Moses married three times, survived three husbands, and
had no children. She was a successful, capable woman of business, owning
and managing commercial property and four apartment buildings in
Jackson, Mississippi, as well as a 480 acre farm. She consumed more
alcoholic beverages than is prudent, but her fondness for alcohol apparently
never impeded her business judgment. She suffered from breast cancer and
heart disease, and underwent a mastectomy in treatment of the cancer. At
age fifty-seven, after the death of the last of her three husbands, she sought
solace and comfort in the company of her attorney, Clarence Holland, a man
fifteen years her junior. Holland and Moses became lovers, a relationship
that was apparently suitable to them, but not to Moses's next of kin, her
elder sister. Unbeknownst to Holland, Moses retained another lawyer, Dan
Shell, to draft her will devising most of her property to Holland. Fannie
66 See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
587 (1989).
67 227 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1969).
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Moses lived for nearly three years after that will was executed. A month
before her death, she called W.R. Patterson, "an experienced, reliable and
honorable attorney who was a friend of hers, 68 and entrusted him with the
original of her will, adding that "Dan Shell drew my willfor me two or three
years ago.. . It's exactly like I want it... I had to go to his office two or
three times to get it the way I wanted it, but this is the way I want it."69
Unfortunately for Moses, and Holland, her wishes were repudiated in a hail
of allegations of undue influence sustained by the Mississippi Supreme
Court, ostensibly on the ground that Shell had failed to provide "meaningful
independent advice or counsel"7 concerning her intended bequest to her
lawyer and lover, Holland. The court's decision was more likely based on
the ground that "this aging woman, seriously ill, disfigured by surgery, and
hopelessly addicted to alcoholic substances, was completely bemused by
the constant and amorous attentions of Holland, a man 15 years her junior
[and] she entertained the pathetic hope that he might marry her."''
Suppose that Mississippi had afforded Fannie Moses a ministerial
procedure to designate Clarence Holland her sole heir, coupled with the
option to trigger the limitations period for contesting the designation by
notifying her displaced heirs. Had she provided actual notice of the
designation to her elder sister, the ultimate contestant of her will, the
limitations period would have expired nine months before her death.72 Had
Fannie's sister challenged the designation during Fannie's lifetime, the
courts would have found it harder to declare Fannie to be under the control
of Clarence Holland because she was in poor health, drinking too much, and
finding love in all the court's wrong places.
Suppose that Mississippi had also afforded Fannie Moses the option of
an administrative procedure. She might then have been required to reveal
to Holland her intentions (in order to satisfy the magistrate of the absence
of any undue influence), but it is possible that her own testimony and that
of Dan Shell would have sufficed to overcome Mississippi's presumption
of undue influence when the beneficiary is in a confidential relationship
with the testator.73 Of equal if not more importance, such testimony would
68 Id. at 843 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
69 Id. (emphasis in original, internal quotations omitted).
70 Id. at 834.
71 Id. at 833.
72 In Mississippi, a will contest may be brought within two years after the will is
offered for probate. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-7-23 (1972). The same period ought to
apply to actions to contest the validity of designations of an heir.
73 As do many states, Mississippi presumes the existence of undue influence in
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have established a presumption of an absence of undue influence under the
proposal made here. Under either of these procedures, Fannie Moses would
have been far more likely to succeed in leaving her property to Clarence
Holland, the last good friend and lover of her life, rather than to her sister.
One cannot read Moses without acquiring the impression that Fannie
Moses's freedom of testamentary disposition was thoroughly eviscerated by
a legal system that viewed her life as of "dubious" morality, to quote the
chancellor in the resulting will contest.74
Small changes at the margin of the law's design may make a big
difference in people's lives. Designation of heirs increases the certainty of
estate planning available to people who exist in nonstandard living arrange-
ments or who wish to make disposition of their property in a manner that is
disadvantageous to their statutory heirs. While not a panacea, particularly
for the same-sex couple who remain denied very significant status benefits,
it does offer immediate benefits that for some people can be especially
valuable. We should not slight incremental advantages simply because they
are not the product of over-arching shifts in the way we view our world. To
paraphrase the hoary old adage that every journey begins with a single step,
improving the human condition through legal change is not always pro-
duced by superhuman leaps and bounds.
transactions between a beneficiary and a person who stands in a confidential relationship to
the beneficiary. See Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190 (1858); Croft v. Alder, 115 So. 2d 683
(Miss. 1959). Moreover, even when there is no presumption of undue influence,
Mississippi places the burden of proving the absence of undue influence on the proponent
of a will. See Croft, 115 So. 2d at 686.
74 Moses, 227 So. 2d at 832.
